For the PRC and Xi Jinping, there may be no better time than invasion than January 20th, 2025, the inauguration day of the returning Donald John Trump. The global conditions and softening norms, the potential for a worsening security environment for China in Asia, and the timing vis a vis Trump’s term in office leave the opportunity ripe for a PRC invasion, making this period perhaps the most likely to succeed without an American intervention, or ramifications, at least for the next four years. The points will be broken down piece by piece.
First, in the wake of the soft global response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, ignoring altogether the prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter to which Taiwan is not a member, there has been a deep tarnishing of the prior norms regarding tolerance of largescale state violence, and the use of force to fulfill government aims. The wars of Russia and Israel, the civil war in Syria with the rampant use of chemical weapons, the extended use of concentration camps in the PRC to hold ethnic Uighurs, and the civil war in Myanmar in which ethnic minority villages are bombed at will as collective punishment, are all prominent examples of abhorrent state behavior carried out with impunity, highlighting this normative breakdown. Other power centers like the BRICS, particularly Brazil and India are not only silent but supportive of the Russian invasion, while the EU’s responses have been limited to the Eastern borders of the conflict, with many states too meek to even cease imports of Russian gas. This signifies that a conflict over Taiwan that is costly in terms of human lives will very likely go unresponded to in the larger world stage. Further, the current logistical sap of the war in Ukraine and the rearmament of NATO states means that the world will at least be largely occupied with that largescale conflict, and will have limited attention to engage with another.
Secondly, Asian states have made no bones about their intention to try to tighten the security environment in the immediate future. An timeline announces intentions for both US forces stationed in Japan, and Japanese SDF forces themselves to receive hundreds of fifth generation F35 jets that would pose an increased threat to PLA fighters in the event of a conflict in neighboring Taiwan. Japan’s LDP has also been clear in its long-term intention to modify Japan’s constitution to allow the military to engage in offensive operations, including permitting the defense of Taiwan. None of these changes have come to fruition yet, though.
South Korea, for its part, the other democratic state in the region with a substantial military capacity and a degree of reticence towards China has now lost its China-skeptic president, and a quick succession of temporary leaders means that until a new one emerges, the ROK will be too enveloped in domestic turmoil to even respond with sanctions, much less work with the American forces on the peninsula to attempt to intervene in an invasion. The long-term potential of the Quad, or even a potential “Asian NATO” emerging long term could seriously threaten PLA attempts in the future, meaning from the Chinese perspective an attack should come sooner rather than later.
Trump’s alternating threats of at times 10%, at times 60%, and at times (targeted at BRICS) up to 100% tariffs on China signify that drastically reduced China-US trade is on the imminent horizon. This means that the cost of American sanctions or economic isolation after an attack would pack significantly less bite if the trade relationship is already shattered. Most often touted threats that China would sabotage its own place in the trade regime if it damaged Taiwan’s semiconductor market (as Trump has threatened to bomb TSMC to prevent it falling into Chinese hands) which supplies its electronics assembly industry, are the most farcical. Already, the PRC has been largely cut off from ASML foundry equipment and other tech, which has meant that China has significantly boosted its own foundry capacity and become self-reliant. Instead of harming the PRC, destroying Taiwan’s semiconductor foundry capacity would in one fell swoop make China the 3rd or 4th largest chip manufacturer in the world, knocking out a major competitor, and boosting international dependence on their own chips. Finally, Taiwan remains the largest thorn in the side of the Sino-American relationship. Settling the “Taiwan Question” once and for all would not only gain Xi Jinping the prestige he so wants and cement CCP legitimacy in the PRC in the face of economic malaise, ending the Chinese civil war and removing Taiwan from consideration would remove the largest obstacle to stable relations with the United States.
The final advantage the PRC has in acting now is the changeover to the Trump administration. While Biden, much to the chagrin of his advisors, shattered the anachronistic, cowardly and utterly impotent “strategic ambiguity” of the 1990s with his reiteration three times that the United States would intervene in the attempt of a unilateral PRC invasion, Trump has almost made the opposite clear. With his “no new wars” mantra, and his historic aversion to deploying or even utilizing American military power for anything other than short term bombing campaigns, it seems that his impulse would be to stand idly by. Some of his cabinet picks, however, notably Rubio and Hegseth, might encourage the opposite. However, after Trump’s macabre set of cabinet picks all but ruled out recess appointments, neither Rubio nor Hegseth would likely join the White House or even have Trump’s ear for weeks if not months. This means that any attack that took place in the immediate vicinity of the inauguration would mean that Trump would likely be alone with the mouth of the isolationist Musk. The fact that it takes place so early in his administration means that rhetorically, he would likely attempt to chalk the blame for the situation up to Biden’s weakness leaving the international system in tatters. He would be strongly reticent to even consider setting the United States for a quagmire in the very first days of his new term. Based on his personality, strong rhetoric against military involvement, and complete lack of regard for the international system and norms against reshaping borders with force, it is almost unthinkable that Trump would choose to intervene in the absence of proximate, resolute, and convincing voices by his side. Therefore, a strike in late January before his cabinet is confirmed would virtually guarantee the US stays out of the conflict.
As such, if China considers even a fraction of the reasons above to be pertinent, the end of January will remain a dangerous time in Taiwan, and the likelihood of an attempted decapitation strike to end the ROC government and sever the military chain of command could approach a likelihood of 50%.